主讲嘉宾： 马利军（教授），深圳大学
题 目：Fan Cultivation and Monetization with Network Effects: Competing Influencers and Collaborating Brands
时 间: 2024年5月27日上午9:00
地 点: 河海大学江宁校区博学楼601会议室
主讲嘉宾简介：马利军，教授，博士生导师，研究工作主要以行为、风险视角下的库存管理、定价及供应链协调为主线展开，相关研究工作为石油化工行业、电子制造行业等行业的有效管理提供了理论依据。主持国家自然科学基金及教育部人文社科基金规划等多项省部级以上项目。在POM，EJOR，TRE，管理工程学报，系统工程理论与实践等国内外重要刊物及重要会议发表论文50余篇。入选广东省首届“优秀青年教师培养计划”，深圳市海外高层次人才“孔雀计划”B类人才，深圳大学首届“荔园优青”培养计划等人才工程。目前兼任《Modern Supply Chain Research and Application》副主编，美国运筹与管理科学协会(INFORMS)会员，美国生产运作协会会员(POMS)，中国生产运作协会会员(POMC)，中国运筹学会随机服务与运作管理分会理事等。
报告摘要：We investigate fan cultivation and monetization with network effects for competing influencers. Influencers are asymmetric in content creation ability, and each influencer cooperates with a brand. They act as marketplaces and monetize their fame by charging commission fees for selling the cooperating brand’s products to consumers. Influencers compete for fans by adjusting content quality in the fan-cultivation stage, and brands determine product prices in the monetization stage. We study myopic influencers caring for short-term sales revenue and farsighted influencers incorporating long-term benefits from consumer surplus. We derive the equilibria of the quality-pricing game between influencers and brands for myopic and farsighted influencers. We reveal how commission rates, content costs, network externality levels, and farsight levels affect the competing influencer marketing supply chains. For myopic influencers, we find that a higher revenue share of a brand does not always benefit the brand. On the other hand, a higher commission rate to an influencer benefits the channel consisting of the influencer and the brand. From the social welfare perspective, it is better for a brand to take a larger share of revenue. The larger the gap between influencers’ abilities is, the greater the social welfare is. For farsighted influencers, we find that caring more about consumer surplus does not necessarily lead to an improvement in consumer surplus. A higher consumer-surplus weight hurts (resp. benefits) a high-ability (resp. low-ability) influencer and the cooperating brand. As the weight on consumer surplus increases, the content quality gap between the influencers shrinks; hence, a low-ability influencer cannibalizes a high-ability influencer’s fans, which may reduce consumer surplus, profit, and social welfare of the high-ability influencer’s channel. Further, as an influencer cares more about consumer surplus, the cooperating brand is more inclined to adopt influencer marketing than run the business by itself, and a brand tends to cooperate with a low-ability influencer rather than a high-ability one.
主办单位：管理科学与信息管理系、管理科学与工程研究所
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